

Frankl & Freud: Friend or Foe?

Towards Cultural & Developmental Perspectives of Theoretical Ideologies

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Viktor Frankl and Sigmund Freud, two influential psychological thinkers of the modern age, have produced penetrating insights regarding the role of culture, human nature, and the therapeutic approach. Although Frankl and Freud together experienced suffering within their own lives and similarly witnessed dramatic socio-political changes within the early twentieth century Austrian cultural landscape, they eventually came to espouse radically different psychological theories. The overall purpose of this paper, then, is to work towards a cultural and developmental perspective of theoretical ideologies generally and a culturally situated perspective of Frankl and Freud's theories specifically. The developmental and cultural perspective adopted for this analysis involves Kleinman's (1995) and Valsiner's (2000) assertions that individuals develop in cultural context by the bidirectional interaction between local and global factors. Therefore, it is argued that both local experiences and global cultural influences should be examined to understand how Frankl and Freud uniquely developed their psychological perspectives.

Amidst nearly a century of turbulence that began with social unrest in the mid nineteenth century, gained momentum through the chaos of the First World War and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and culminated with the rise in Nazi power, the Anschluss of 1938, and the Second World War, Austria in general, and Vienna in particular, proved to be fertile ground for the development of what posterity has come to regard as some of the most thought provoking theoretical ideologies ever conceived. Throughout these years and vast socio-political changes, Vienna had distinguished herself as a center for artistic and scientific endeavors: Friedrich Kraus, Richard Strauss, Johannes Brahms, Robert Musil, Ernst Mach, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, all attaining fantastic intellectual and creative heights. Among them also stood arguably two of the most influential psychological thinkers of the modern era—Viktor Frankl and Sigmund Freud; who, during years of suffering and difficulties in their own lives, have produced penetrating insights regarding the roles and characteristics of cultural systems, human nature and therapeutic encounters. It is interesting to question how these two psychological thinkers came to espouse the radically different theories that they did? What factors—historical, developmental, socio-political, cultural or otherwise—came to influence Frankl and Freud's psychological ideologies and persuade their movement in one trajectory or another? These questions among others guide and inform the current purpose of working towards a culturally situated perspective of Frankl and Freud's theories in particular or arguing for the importance of cultural context in the study of theoretical ideologies in general.

The concept of culture has evolved over the years, changing from context to context and situation to situation, carrying with it a certain “vagueness” and contentious nature (Valsiner, 2009). Conceptions of culture in positivist psychological discourse often focus on broad homogenous factors that are likened to a “bounded group” which can then be easily compared to another group on a particular characteristic of interest (i.e., American, Japanese, and Russian etc.) (Matsumoto, 2006). Along these lines, conceptions of culture are inspired from researchers like Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) who examined existing definitions of culture in their time and offered a synthesized understanding wherein, “culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups...” (p. 181). More recently, George Barnett and Mehiohua Lee (2002) add to the growing cultural discourse by synthesizing Geertz, Durkheim, and Goodenough to define culture as

“a property of a group. It is a group’s shared collective meaning system through which the group’s collective values, attitudes, beliefs, customs and thoughts are understood. It is as emergent property of the member’s social interaction and a determinant of how group members communicate” (p. 277).

Taken together, however, these conceptions of culture—focusing solely on the global properties of distinct groups—often encourage researchers to exaggerate distinctions while discounting similarities.

Several cultural theorists, such as Keesing (1990), argue that previous positivist conceptions of culture—like those mentioned above that focus on global factors of group membership only—tend to espouse a kind of “radical alterity,” exaggerating exotic elements of different cultural systems while overlooking elements in common. Keesing (1990) argued for a move away from definitive definitions of culture so to avoid issues of reification, essentialism, or to mistakenly presuppose the idea that cultures are “hermetically sealed” or bounded to a particular time or location. In this regard, Kleinman (1995) advises that culture be conceptualized as “what is at stake” for particular individuals in particular situations, with a focus on “collective (both local and societal) and individual (both public and intimate) levels of analysis” (p. 98). From this perspective, culture moves away from the exotic rainforests of the South American Amazon to the everyday lives of North American Wal-Mart shoppers, suggesting that whatever is at stake for individuals within their particular local social worlds involves, in some way or another, cultural systems. This perspective of culture is adopted in the foregoing analysis to examine not only the global socio-political factors that impacted Frankl and Freud’s ideologies, but also their “local social world” and how certain experiences also influenced their perspective of human psychology.

In connection with trends in cultural theory, developmental discourse generally argues that individuals are influenced throughout the life course by the bidirectional interaction of what some researchers are calling the local (personal) and global (collective) social worlds (Hollan, 2000; Keesing, 1990; Kleinman, 1995; Rogoff, 2004; Valsiner, 2000;). Cultural anthropologists Shweder and Miller (1991), for example, suggest that the connection between self-conceptions and the cultural landscape is a complex process where both

require each other “and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up” (p. 73). In terms of the broad global perspective, Shweder and Bourne (1984) suggest that there are four primary cultural factors that mutually impact the conceptualization of the self and the development of the individual: worldviews, metaphors, thinking styles and the social structure. These authors contend, therefore, that different self-conceptions are the result of the dialectic combination of these four global cultural factors. In terms of the local perspective, Valsiner (2000) suggests that based on the needs and experiences of individuals in local situations they can adopt aspects of these four global factors in varying ways. To develop this idea further, Valsiner’s (2000) describes Baldwin’s theory of *heterogeneity of experiences* which suggests that because individuals’ global social environments are heterogeneous—that is, individuals within a particular society inevitably have access to multiple worldviews, metaphors, thinking styles and social structures—they construct individualized static templates (schema) based on the dialogue between the needs within their local situations and the cultural factors available to them. This individualized schema, or what is referred to in this paper as a *conceptual framework*, later works to inform people about expected future events. In other words, this schema or conceptual framework further allows individuals to become selective, consciously or not, as to the content and variety of actual environmental stimulation that is taken in and assimilated into memory. Thus, the analysis of Frankl and Freud involves looking at particular life experiences that may have shaped their respective conceptual frameworks that, in turn, have developmentally altered their visions of reality and subsequent theoretical ideologies.

To integrate these two developmental and cultural levels of analysis, we may turn to Hollan (2000) who examined the extent to which individuals distinctly drew on the surrounding cultural systems during his fieldwork amongst Toraja men in Indonesia. One of the ways in which Toraja men demonstrated masculinity and maturity was through a cultural idiom in which they scared the tops of their forearms. During his field studies, Hollan observed how these cultural practices were internalized and embodied (as scars on the arms) in distinct ways among the seven men he interviewed. This variation was significant for Hollan because it empirically demonstrates how broader level standardized cultural forms are subject to a certain degree of modification and personalization before becoming internalized and manifested. Thus, Hollan (2000), advocating a constructivist model of the mind¹, argues that no two people will internalize global cultural models in the same way. In looking to understand the difference between Frankl and Freud then—how they came to such radically different views of human nature and the social world as well as the ways in which their theoretical perspective developed within a cultural context—we must attempt to understand how different internalized representations of their global worlds created unique conceptual frameworks as well as their local social world and how they negotiated the everyday experiences of Austrian life.

¹ Constructivist models of mind as articulated by Hollan (2000) assert, “consciousness of ourselves and other things must be actively constructed out of our myriad engagements with the world” (p. 539). This idea is developed in contrast to previous models that assume experience is conscious until acted on or pushed out of awareness.

In order to explore the cultural and experiential context within which Frankl and Freud developed their theories, this paper begins with a discussion pertaining to “culture” and how each psychological thinker came to conceptualize the role of *cultural systems or society* within individual lives. The second section involves a dialogue between Frankl and Freud regarding their respective views on *human nature* or the *self*. Finally, this paper concludes by exploring how their different views of culture, society and human nature impact these author’s perspectives of the *therapeutic encounter*. Overall, it is argued that when looking to explain the distinction between Frankl and Freud’s psychological perspectives, we must examine the broader Austrian and Viennese cultural milieu of the early twentieth century, while simultaneously supplementing this broad perspective by looking to individual experiences and “what was at stake” for these two thinkers in their local social worlds while developing their theories (Klienman, 1995).

This endeavour is pressing insofar as it brings into perspective the importance of contextualizing the development of a scientific theory—within the cultural landscape, historical time period, and local social world—in an attempt to better examine its limitations and advantages. This type of contextualized presentation of a theory lends credence to the idea that intellectual theories themselves are not completely “free-floating” on the one hand, nor are they completely culturally bounded or “hermetically sealed” on the other (Keesing, 1990). Rather, as this paper suggests, intellectual theories are in dialogue and negotiation with broader socio-cultural or political systems of their time, as well as the local social world of their originator.

PERSPECTIVES OF CULTURE & SOCIETY

Sigmund Freud was born into a humble Jewish family on May 6th 1856 in Friberg, a rural Austrian town. Shortly thereafter, in 1860, his family moved to Vienna. Following his family’s predictions early in life that “golden sigi” would later achieve great things, the Austrian youth attended Sperlgymnasium—a specialized European type of secondary education—from 1865 to 1873 (Johnston, 1972). After successful graduation, Freud entered the Medical Faculty at Vienna. Although passionate about his new field of study, Freud delayed his graduation from Medical school until 1881 due to his interest in working as a research assistant for several years between 1876 and 1881 in the physiological laboratory of Ernst Brücke. In later 1885, still under the supervision and fascination of Brücke’s physiology, Freud won a travel stipend to study for several months in Paris under the renowned neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot² who specialized in the study of hysteria and its susceptibility to hypnosis. It was during these formative years in Brücke’s laboratory, Edmundson (2007) suggests, that Freud’s worldview and indoctrination into positivism was solidified. Upon returning from his studies in France, Freud happily married Martha Bernays, and in the years following they produced six children together. In 1891 the growing Freud family moved to a second-story apartment in Vienna at Berggasse 19, wherein Freud developed his psychoanalytic practice and produced the many theoretical ideologies that made him known throughout Europe and the United States.

² A French Neurologist known as the “founder of modern neurology” who suggested that mental states can be explained by neurology. Notable students, apart from Freud include Pierre Janet and Alfred Binet.

In 1905, shortly after Sigmund Freud published one of his first major works entitled *Interpretations of Dreams*, Viktor Frankl was born into a Jewish family of civil servants in the bustling capital of Vienna.³ Like Freud, Frankl also attended Sperlgynasium in his youth and graduated in 1923 with a special interest in psychology. Following his graduation, Frankl also entered the college of Medicine and the University of Vienna where he later specialized in neurology and psychiatry with a specific interest in depression and suicide. Frankl graduated from medical school in 1930 and shortly thereafter began practicing as a doctor at a state hospital that focused on the treatment of female suicide victims (Frankl, 1997). After growing tension between Nazi-Germany and Austria, the German forces, having already gathered on the border in Bavaria, crossed over into Austria with no opposition on Saturday March 12, 1938. A few years after the Nazi Germany invasion, the Jewish Viktor Frankl at the age of 37 was taken with his wife and parents to Theresienstadt (Terezín) a “model ghetto” camp in present day Czech Republic on September 1942 (Frankl, 1997; Pytell, 2007). Theresienstadt was overcrowded, littered with starving and malnourished individuals and was more reminiscent of a concentration camp than it was with the model ghetto for “privileged Jews” that it espoused to be. Frankl remained in Theresienstadt until October 1944 where he was then transported to Auschwitz. Finally, some days later he was further transported to Turkheim where he remained until the end of the Second World War. During these traumatic experiences of camp life, Frankl developed some of the many theories he has come to be known for in the West, including his views of culture and society.

In the written account of his concentration camp experiences entitled, “Man’s Search for Meaning,” Frankl (1984) lends insight into his depiction of both human reality and the role or place of culture in human lives:⁴

“In the final analysis it become clear that the sort of person the prisoner became was a result of his inner decision, and not the result of the camp influences alone” (p. 87).

“In the concentration camps, for example, in this living laboratory and on this testing ground, we watched and witnessed some of our comrades behave like swine while others behaved liked saints. Man has both potentialities within himself; which one is actualized depends on decisions but not on conditions” (p. 157).

It is immediately apparent that Frankl places central importance on human agency or individual autonomy. For him, people can choose to be decent (saint) or non-decent (swine)—a choice entirely dependent on their “inner decisions” and *not* their outer “conditions”. This idea reflects Spiro’s (1987) observations wherein an internal human core is believed to project out into the world to produce culture. Spiro’s (1987) “human nature” thesis of cultural systems, as it is often referred to, suggests that humans everywhere are similar in terms of their mental capacities—the ability to make an internal choice in

³ Although both Frankl and Freud were born into Jewish families, Frankl is often regarded as being closer to his Jewish roots due to the strong influence of his father and the fact that they remained kosher until the First World War made it impossible (Freud, 1952; Frankl, 1997; Edmundson, 2007).

⁴ Although I find it difficult to discuss culture without bringing up the notion of “self” or human nature, I will attempt to present cultural views first followed by a discussion of the self as a cultural construction.

response to an external condition. In a similar manner, Frankl's observations within the concentration camps suggest that individuals' can above all else choose their cultural practices or the ways in which they behave within the world.⁵ Indeed, Frankl (1984) suggests, "as for the environment, we know that it does not make man, but that everything depends on what man makes of it, on his attitude towards it" (p. xix). From this perspective, day-to-day cultural practices or what is at stake for an individual are essentially choices that arise from an autonomous center or an internal human core.

At the same time, however, Frankl proposed the idea of *responsibility* that he argues must compliment this previous assertion of individual autonomy or freedom.⁶ For Frankl, responsibility signifies a dialogical or co-constitutive relationship between the individual and the broader social world; in that, individuals are understood to not only *draw on* larger social discourses as they navigate their local social worlds, but they also *contribute to* and help shape those broader social discourses with every consequent decision:

"Existential analysis considers community as a task imposed upon each individual, as something that must first of all be "achieved." Man has to subscribe to the community, has to decide for it. This decision is never already made by man in his creatural state; rather, it is always waiting to be made. Human society, strictly speaking, is far more than the zoological community, more than a complex of curbs and restraints. Primarily, human society is always the still-to-be-conquered area for the actualization of possible values of for self-realization" (Frankl, 1963, p. 80).

From this position, each individual *is responsible* to the global social discourse—shared cultural myths, worldviews, metaphors, and thinking styles—because individuals' decisions ultimately impact the larger socio-cultural discourses in which members of a particular society are embedded. Although this initial analysis is insightful, it is nonetheless a one-sided picture. What is the role of the unconscious, Freud muses, and to what extent is the ability to make an autonomous choice limited to the available cultural repertoire in one's environment?

In contrast to Frankl, Sigmund Freud suggests that cultural systems impose regulations necessary for survival against the threat of both violent aggressions from the external environment and violent aggressions from our own human nature. Cultural systems for Freud act to suppress natural human instincts, and without "this protective grip of culture" our unconscious aggressive tendencies would surface creating disharmony in our social structures (Freud, 1927). Indeed, in *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud (1930) suggests

"Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of man towards one another. Culture has to call up every possible

⁵ I use here the distinction proposed by Matsumoto (2006) between cultural practices and cultural worldviews. The former indicates individual behaviors, whereas the latter refers to an individual's thoughts, and subjective meanings.

⁶ In fact, on several occasions Viktor Frankl proposed that the statue of liberty on the Eastern coast of the United States be complimented with a statue of responsibility on the West coast. Indeed, there are plans to construct such a statue by 2010. See Statue of Responsibility Foundation website for more details: <http://www.sorfoundation.org>

reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men and hold their manifestations in check by reaction-formulations in men's minds" (p. 86).

From this perspective, culture or society functions to mitigate the inherently aggressive nature of man in order for group solidarity to subsist. In another example, from Freud's (1927) *The Future of an Illusion*, culture is defined to have two aspects:

"It [culture] includes on the one hand all the knowledge and capacity that man have acquired in order to control the forces of nature and extract its wealth for the satisfaction of human needs, and, on the other hand, all the regulations necessary in order to adjust the relations of men to one another and especially the distribution of available wealth" (p. 2-3).

From these two illustrations it is apparent that Frankl's human agency is almost entirely absent. Rather, for Freud unmitigated individual freedom is a threat to cultural regulation. In fact, Freud (1927) suggests, "sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution" (p. 63). From this view, cultural knowledge is seen as an additive to human nature, an extra cognitive capacity that could improve an individual's nature in order to facilitate necessary social interaction.

GLOBAL CULTURAL INFLUENCES

It is apparent from the previous accounts of Frankl and Freud's perspectives of culture and society that their views radically differ. Although there are many potential factors as to why Frankl and Freud's theories developed in distinct ways—including historical, experiential, or cultural factors—varying historical time periods and broader cultural influences are explored here not only to highlight potential reasons as to why these thinkers diverge the ways they do, but also to expose some of the global cultural factors that impacted the development of Frankl and Freud's respective ideological positions.⁷

As previously mentioned, the end of the Great War in 1918 and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, created a somewhat precarious situation in Vienna. As a result of the war, there was mass inflation in the 1920s followed by the great economic depression of the 1930s. In May of 1931, one of Vienna's largest commercial banks, the Creditanstalt, declared bankruptcy, and only a few years later a quarter of the Viennese labor force was unemployed (Johnston, 1972; Edmundson, 2007). In response to these socio-political changes, there was socialist revolt in Vienna's working class in 1934, which was strictly and murderously suppressed by the barely stable government of Engelbert Dollfuss who acted as the chancellor of Austria from 1932-1934. Less than six months after the working class revolt was covered up by the acting government, another coup was attempted in which Dollfuss himself was killed by the emerging Nazi powers. Vienna during those is reminiscent of what Marx (1967) referred to as the emerging complications of modernity:

⁷ In later sections, individual or local experiential factors that help to distinguish between these two thinkers, as well as helped to shape their individual ideologies, are explored in more detail.

“Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is sold melts into air, all that is holy is profaned” (p. 42).

It was during these contentious years that Freud was writing *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) as well as *The Future of an Illusion* (1927). By reflecting on these broad cultural and political factors in which Freud was embedded during these years, certain aspects of his theoretical ideologies become illuminated. For Example, describing the relation between Freud’s theories and the larger Viennese socio-political context, Johnston (1972) suggests

“Secretiveness blanketed public life, prompting a search for latent meanings behind every event. Whatever seemed inexplicable was attributed to conspirators, whether they be Jews, Czechs, Social Democrats, Protestants or journalists” (p. 239).

Thus, during this turbulent time in Vienna’s history, suspicious inclinations were rampant, ultimately driving many individuals—including Freud—to look into every occurrence convinced some underlying influences or motives would be discovered. Moreover, Johnston (1972) argues

“When he [Freud] spoke of the superego censoring id, he knew what press censorship meant: a story would be missing from the front page, unleashing a fresh spate of rumors. Helpless—Freud would say castrated—before the bureaucracy, the populace indulged fantasy’s that belittled the omnipotent personages who manipulated them. Most Austrians harbored feelings of paranoia toward the state, exacerbating tensions and causing the violence that erupted” (p. 239).

It becomes apparent from these descriptions that the social context within which Freud was developing his psychological theories served as potent examples from which he drew. The system of leadership before the collapse of the Austrian empire, as well as the form of government being established in its stead, both, in many ways, reflected Freud’s emerging tripartite system of the individual—the superego censoring the id recapitulates the state censoring the individual. Furthermore, Barbu (1952) and Schick (1964) argue that in developing his views related to the individual and their relation to society as well as the unconscious aspects of motivation, Freud was naturally influenced by the cultural milieu of Habsburg bureaucracy. Indeed, Fromm (1980) also suggests that Freud’s psychological depiction of individuals’ relations to their culture and society corresponds to the social reality in which Freud was situated. Just as a ruling minority controls the social majority, Fromm (1980) observes, so too the psyche is supposed to be controlled by the authority of the ego and superego. In other words, the danger of the id or the dark unconscious human aspects breaking through to the conscious parallels the danger of the lower classes breaking through the normal social order in a kind of social revolution. It is apparent, therefore, from these brief examples, that Freud’s intellectual theories were developed in and out of dialogue between his own experiences and the broader social world of his time.

Viktor Frankl was born some 49 years after Freud. This not only signifies a strong generational difference between them but also means that they were exposed to radically different cultural norms when growing up. Frankl was a teenager during the 1920s, which, along with being a time of social turbulence and transition in Vienna, was also a period where very “progressive” ideas came to fruition as compared to earlier and subsequent decades (Johnston, 1972). For example, homosexuality was beginning to be expressed much more openly, radical political ideologies were being discussed more openly in the public sphere, and women’s liberation movements were increasingly gaining momentum, women being allowed to vote in most countries in Europe by that time. Therefore, these influences of a more “progressive” environment during Frankl’s youth in the 1920s and 30s were a radically different environment from the much more restrictive and conservative culture in Austria during the time Freud was developing his ideas about the suppressive nature of society and culture. We can see, then, how Frankl’s emphasis—and perhaps overemphasis—on the individuals ability to assert their freedom over their environment, culture or society also is developed in and out of dialogue with the surrounding cultural environment, which, in this case, could be understood as a response to Freud and the oblique worldview he espoused.

Although initially fascinated with some of Freud’s theories, Frankl eventually came to reject most of his thoughts as being to “suppressive” and limited in scope, focusing only on the lower animal instincts of humans and not fully acknowledging the potential and ability for humans to overcome difficulty (Frankl, 1997). During his days as a student, Frankl took university courses from Eduard Hitschmann and Paul Schilder, both of which were prominent Freudian lecturers in Frankl’s days (Cohen, 1977; Pytell, 2001). From these years onward, Frankl was interested with Freudianism and started corresponding with Freud by sending him research articles he thought Freud would find interesting (Frankl, 1997). In fact, Freud was apparently so impressed with some of Frankl’s thinking that he sent one of their correspondence letters off to the *Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Psychoanalyse* for publication in 1924. Moreover, Pytell (2007) observes that Frankl had apparently made such a strong impression on Freud that during a chance encounter on the Viennese’s streets—allegedly the only time these two ever met in person—Freud responded by citing from memory the youth Frankl’s address. In the years that followed, however, Frankl began to diverge from Freud’s views, and during one conference on psychoanalysis, Frankl says he was compelled to leave in the middle of another exhausting explanation about the aggressive and sexual undercurrents of human motivation (Frankl, 1997). Overall, although influenced by Freud, Frankl was moved to develop his own views of culture and society largely in response to Freud’s oppressive cultural theories and the global socio-cultural situation during this prior historical era.

To conclude, for Freud culture largely acts from the outside of an individual to suppress the natural aggressive instincts within. For Frankl rather, culture emerges from within the individual and becomes manifest as the result of a dialogue between the broader social world and the autonomous choice. Although there are many factors that potentially influenced the development of Frankl and Freud’s theoretical ideologies, a prominent example explored in this section was the sociopolitical context and time periods that separated them. Overall, different global experiences and historical influences contributed

to the development of unique conceptual frameworks of reality, which, in turn, required both Frankl and Freud to espouse radically different views of society, culture and the individual's role within it. As we will see, these distinct global influences also contributed to each author's distinct views regarding human nature or the self—a topic we turn to next.

ON THE “SELF” AND HUMAN NATURE

Viktor Frankl and Sigmund Freud, both interested in the workings and behaviors of their fellow human beings, have articulated detailed models describing their understanding of human nature and the “self.”⁸ To begin, we briefly review how the self and human nature have been approached in previous historical and contemporary writings. English philosopher John Locke (1694/1994) proposed that the “self” pertained to a stable inner human core, which he called the *perceiving self*: the central point of consciousness that interprets human experiences and orchestrates both the internal life and the external being in the world. Thus, true to his empiricist background, Locke challenged previous notions of the self as being connected to an eternal soul as presented in Plato's *Phaedo* or Augustine's *Confessions*. Several years later, the American philosopher and psychologist William James (1892) rejected Locke's stable unchanging self, and instead suggested that the self is stable and coherent while at the same time changing over time and across contexts. James is noted for proposing two functional subsystems of the self, which he termed the “I” and the “Me”. The former pertained to the volitional self or the knower and is continuous across time. The latter is described as the socially engaged self that constantly changes and adapts to new situations and contexts. More recently psychologists and anthropologists including De Munck (2000) and Goffman (1959) have suggested there is no inner human core or “I” and instead only the performative behavior or “Me” exists. For Goffman (1959), the self is simply the behavior that is provided by what he terms *cultural stages*: the scripts and masks that are provided to people by the larger social narratives and discourses. De Munck (2000) and Goffman (1959) both suggest that the self exists only as a mental representation or as a constellation of narratives and they further posit that the self has no actual ontological status apart from its interaction with the social environment.

At this point it may be argued that the concept of the “self”, whether as an internal stable core or as an external dynamic representation, is a universal human phenomenon. Indeed, Jerome Bruner (1996) suggests that, “perhaps the single most universal thing about human experience is the phenomenon of “Self” (p. 35). If this is true, we must ask ourselves what factors can potentially impact one's understanding of the self or human nature? To explore this question we examine the individual local social worlds of both Frankl and Freud to see what was at stake for them during the development of their theoretical perspectives of the self or human nature.

Sigmund Freud entered school an atheist and left an atheist with persuasive scientific arguments. As mentioned, Freud received his M.D. in 1881 from the University of Vienna at the age of 25 with a specialization in neurology. Along side his school years and his

⁸ Although these terms (self and human nature) may not be synonymous, I will initially discuss them as one, then in following sections attempt to pull apart their distinctions and discuss their relation.

subsequent work under the sway of Brücke, Freud was also deeply influenced by another distinguished Viennese professor, Carl Von Rokitansky (1804-1878). Rokitansky, Johnston (1972) notes, perhaps more so than other professors of his time, strictly adhered to empirical medicine. Being persuaded—like most respectable scientists of the late nineteenth century—by Darwin’s observations of a few decades prior, Rokitansky, and later Freud, developed an overly aggressive view of human nature: “Protoplasm at every level of existence is hungry,” said Rokitansky, “necessitating each organism to be aggressive so as to stamp out rivals” (Johnston, 1972, p 225). Rokitansky was infamous for asserting that because of the protoplasm within them, humans can not help but resort to lies and deceit—failings that only the state could potentially curb—and thus individuals were destined to undergo a type of Darwinian struggle for survival. In addition to these empirical, biological or evolutionary groundings in his perspective of human nature, Rokitansky also held a hostile view towards religion and spiritual inclinations, a perspective Freud was also coming close to espousing. Indeed, Rokitansky was known, apart from his medical practice, for his relentless fight to have compulsory catholic religion removed from the Viennese school systems (Johnston, 1972). Thus, these and other developments at the beginning of the twentieth century signified what could be referred to as the modernization or secularization of Austrian or Viennese society—the Catholic Church bells that so characterized the Austrian cultural milieu of the previous centuries were slowly being muffled.

After returning to Vienna from a short study under Charcot, Freud along with close friend J. Breuer, investigated women suffering from hysteria and together published “Studies on Hysteria”—a case study on Breuer’s former patient, Anna O. After working with women suffering from hysteria for several years, observing their symptoms, and listening to their distress, Freud began to theorize that hysteria originates from sexual malfunctioning (Freud, 1935). In 1895 Freud began to analyze his first dreams, which prompted his later publication entitled *Interpretations of Dreams*. Upon this landmark publication in 1900, Sigmund Freud began to attract a small circle of pupils including C.G. Jung who, from that point onward, took interest in psychoanalysis and Freud’s developing theories. These beginnings initiated Freud’s influence and fame and ultimately marked the creation of the First Viennese School of psychotherapy.⁹ Freud’s work with dreams was theoretically significant insofar as he started to systematically develop his ideas about the unconscious—an idea already surfacing in the United States by William James—while at the same time served as a reminder that Freud was deeply enmeshed in the traditional physiological or biological interpretation of mental events (Freud, 1935).

In 1914, perhaps confirming Freud’s developing idea of the aggressive nature of man, Austria’s Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated.¹⁰ Six weeks later marked the beginning of the First World War. During the war, Freud continued to develop key ideas about the unconscious aspects of human nature, the aggressive contours of the self,

⁹ There have since been three Viennese School’s of psychotherapy. The first is attributed to Freud and his psychoanalysis. The Second is attributed to Adler and his Individual psychology. The third is attributed to Frankl and his Logotherapy.

¹⁰ Freud (1952) notes in the introduction to his autobiography “the war as beastly as it was, confirmed the skeptical psychoanalytic appraisal of human nature” (p. xix)

repression and melancholia. Not only did the First World War unveil the self-destructive forces latent within individuals and the European civilization writ large, it also fueled Freud's theoretical developments leading him forever to espouse the potentially harmful dimensions of the human psyche. With the post war transformation of the Austrian empire into republics, Vienna grew hungry and desperate—littered with deadly diseases such as influenza and tuberculosis. In 1923 following these significant global and personal events, Freud published his classic study of *The Ego and the Id* (1923), which perhaps, along with *Future of an Illusion* (1927) and *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), most clearly describes his contemptuous outlook of human nature.

According to Freud, the self is synonymous with the ego: the rational self, a mechanistic, repressive agent that actively works to suppress the drives of the id in order to make behavior consonant with the imposed norms and requirements of social reality (Freud, 1924). From another perspective, the self, the person, human nature and the psyche are presented as similar constructs, and can all be divided into the tripartite collection of the ego, superego and the id. The id is described as the impulsive childlike dimension of the self that is largely driven by what Freud terms the "pleasure principle" (Freud, 1924; Botstein, 2007). The superego on the other hand is understood as the moral self-component that regulates and imposes sanction on the id's impulses. The ego or rational self is the arena where the id and superego interact and where some sense of self-coherence is theoretically maintained. For Freud, the self does not simply denote consciousness, as suggested by Locke's perceiving self. Instead the self is understood as bridging the space between conscious and unconscious reality. Therefore, at anytime the surging forces of the unconscious can swell up and take hold of the conscious mind (Botstein, 2007). Moreover, Freud's view is reminiscent of James's (1892) distinction between the "Me" and the "I". Freud's ego is essentially the external self ("Me") that is forced to adapt to the social context, in return the id becomes the constant force ("I") of human nature. By associating a constant human nature to the id, Freud ultimately deduced human nature to that of the animals, in that humans are driven by instinctual drives and sexual impulses. Indeed, in *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud (1930) asserts that "men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved... they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness" (1930, p. 68). Overall, Freud's outlook of human nature was subsumed within and greatly influenced by the larger psychiatric and philosophical discourse of his time (Velikovsky, 1941). Individuals like Charcot, Brücke and Rokitansky, came to shape Freud's thought in profound ways. On this note, Littlewood (2002) argues that a pervasive assumption within positivistic psychiatry during the mid nineteenth and early twentieth century maintained an objectified biological view of humanity not too dissimilar from their animal kin. Indeed, as we have seen, Sigmund Freud came to espouse this view, which was ultimately reflective of his larger socio-cultural environment in which he was embedded.

Although being exposed to some similar psychiatric assumptions as Freud, Viktor Frankl came to quite a different perspective of the self and human nature. From as early as fifteen years of age Frankl possessed a love for existential philosophy and humanist psychology (Frankl, 1997). Around the same time, Frankl remembers contemplating death and coming to the conclusion that nothing of the transitory nature of life can destroy its meaning.

Frankl, like Freud, lived through the difficult events of WWI and the reshaping of Austria that took place shortly thereafter. However, Frankl (1997) distinctly remembers that even through the difficult times of waiting in line for potato rations there is always the potential to discover an underlying meaning behind it and thus to “turn an apparently meaningless suffering into a genuine human achievement” (p. 53)¹¹. These existential reflections become a theme for Frankl’s developing years which later formed the base of the Academic Society for Medical Psychology, which he founded 1933 (Pytell, 2001). Following this, Frankl began systematizing his meaning centered form of psychotherapy. After reflecting for some years on the existential contours of his patients’ sufferings, Pytell (2007) observes that in 1937 Frankl wrote a paper revealing his therapeutic outlook of “height psychology” entitled, “On the Mental/Spiritual Problem in psychotherapy.” In 1938, however, after increasing pressure and restriction from the already occupying Nazi forces, Frankl was sent to the concentration camps. Although Frankl’s unique views of human nature was emerging as early as 1929, the intense suffering experienced within the concentration camps ultimately provided him with the empirical insights needed to validate his already developing ideas.

In terms of the self, Frankl essentially emphasized the decision-making responsibility of the conscious mind and played down the negative role of the unconscious. To be human, Frankl asserts, is to be conscious and responsible (Frankl, 1963). During his concentration camp experiences, Frankl came to assert a dualistic nature of humanity—decent or non-decent, swine or saint—after witnessing countless examples of prisoners exemplifying both characteristics. Therefore, Frankl believed the unconscious is not only the realm of instinctual drives and animalistic aggression but also a place of potential goodness or genuine human altruism. Consequently, the actualization of behavior reflects the choice or stand individuals take with regards to their own potentialities of being: either animalistic aggressionism or genuine altruism:

“The experiences of camp life show that man does have a choice of action. There were enough examples, often of heroic nature, which proved that apathy could be overcome, irritability suppressed. Man can preserve a vestige of spiritual freedom, of independence of mind, even in such terrible conditions of psychic and physical stress. Everything can be taken from man but one thing: the last of all human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given situation, or set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way” (Frankl, 1984, p. 86).

An important aspect or characteristic of human choice is depicted by Frankl as the capacity or ability to transcend the self. In his autobiographical account, Frankl says, “I repeatedly tried to distance myself from the misery that surrounded me by externalizing it” (p. 98). This “decentering” or transcending of the self became a method of survival essentially providing evidence against Freud’s universal biological determinism of human nature. Indeed, Frankl (1963) argues

¹¹Many of Frankl’s ideas potentially relate to contemporary ideas of resilience. See Masten, A. S., Best, K. M., & Garmezy, N. (1990). Resilience and development: Contributions from the study of children who overcome adversity. *Development and Psychopathology*, 2, 425-444.

“For when man opposes the limitations of nature, when as a human being he “takes a stand” on them, when he ceases to be subjugated and blindly obedient to the constraints imposed by the biological factor (race), the sociological factor (class) or the psychological factor (character type)—only then can he be judged morally. Overcoming these factors is a freedom that constitutes the essence of man” (p. 23-24).

The concentration camps were for Frankl, therefore, *experimentum crucis* (Frankl, 1997). Self-transcendence was verified, validated and explored in the concentration camp, which, for Frankl (1997), confirmed the autonomous possibility to overcome the lower nature and to choose self-transcendence—“the reaching out beyond ourselves for something other than ourselves” (p. 97).

By analyzing Frankl and Freud’s perspective within James’s “I/Me” distinction, Frankl’s “I” is composed of two subcomponents—the higher (decent) nature and the lower (non-decent) nature. Frankl asserts that the self or “I” can ultimately be transcended, thus orienting the self towards a separate category that could be separated from James’s “I/Me” distinction as the “We”. Frankl suggests that human beings have the potential to be selfless, whereby the conscious mind or using Freud’s term, the ego, literally revolves around the “other” as a reference point.¹² Consequently, the self-aspect that is in dialogue with the social world, or James’s “Me” can thus be the manifestation of either the “I” (lower nature) or the “We” (higher nature). For Frankl, this dualistic nature is universally present in all humans—the actualization of which is entirely dependent on individual autonomy. On this point, Frankl and Freud meet and at the same time diverge. On the one hand, Frankl and Freud both acknowledge the universally animal instinct inherent to humanity (I/id) governed by the pleasure principle or biologically determined. Where Frankl diverges from Freud, however, is in the notion that this aspect of the self or human nature can ultimately be transcended, manifesting an alternate “decent” self (“We”) that is not determined by biological drives and instincts, yet is still nonetheless universal.

SUFFERING & HUMAN NATURE

Although both Frankl and Freud endured intense suffering during their life, it is interesting to question how these two thinkers came to espouse such radically different views of human nature? In particular, since both Frankl and Freud developed their theories within a turbulent socio-political context, as well as experienced extreme sufferings throughout their lives, how is it that amidst these negative events Frankl developed a positive, hopeful, and non-deterministic vision of human nature, whereas Freud came to espouse a more fatalistic, negative perspective one might expect from witnessing the traumas he did? It is argued here that the differing ways in which this suffering was *interpreted* by Frankl and Freud was a major factor that distinguished between them, as well as an element that facilitated their distinctive views of human nature.

¹² It is interesting to note that Csordas (1997) suggested that the self in reference to the sacred “other” in particular has significant healing potentials. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a link could be drawn between the kind of self-transcendence described by Frankl here, and certain trance states of dissociation. Both of which are reported to have important therapeutic effects. See Lewis-Fernandez (1998) and Csordas (1997).

As previously mentioned, social unrest during the First World War and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, brought widespread disease, famine and poverty to Austria and Vienna which impinged on the lives of many, especially those of Jewish background.¹³ And again during the subsequent years leading into the Second World War, these conditions worsened. During the beginning stages of the Anschluss, Edmundson (2007) highlights how the Jews were under attack:

“Nazis broke into Jewish homes and businesses, beat up everyone on the premises, and took what they wanted. The streets become a sort of black carnival, an urban hell, where all the bottled-up racial hatred of the last decades exploded into the open” (p. 47).

Thus, the life of the Viennese citizen, and the Jew in particular, was filled with intense difficulties lasting for nearly four decades. Although being separated by more than fifty years, both Frankl and Freud suffered from these years of tribulations.

Since Freud was well into his fifties and already well known in academic circles during the First World War, his family remained financially stable during these socio-political changes (Johnston, 1972). However, since disease was rampant during and after the War, Freud's daughter Sophie had died of influenza pneumonia in the twenties and her four-year-old son, Freud's cherished grandson Heinz Rudolf, lost his life from a similar condition three years later (Freud, 1952). In addition to these dismal social conditions and personal losses, Freud also endured excruciating personal pain from over fifteen years of cancer of the palate, known to be caused by his infamous love of cigars (Haynal, 2008). Before the turn of the twentieth century and the First World War, Freud had already undergone thirty-three operations under local anesthesia, and lived everyday of those years with a gaping hole in the roof of his mouth wherein an ill-fitting prosthesis was held. Edmundson (2007) notes that his indifference to pain during these later years was instilled due to the grief over the loss of his daughter and grandson some years prior.

Frankl was only a boy of ten years old during the First World War and his family was hit hard by poverty as depicted in his recollections of waiting in line for potatoes rations (Frankl, 1997). During the years that followed however, the life of the Jewish-Austrian became increasingly more difficult. In 1939, the hospital where Frankl was employed was overrun by Nazi authorities thereby limiting the freedom of his practice. In September of 1942, Frankl, his wife Tilly, and his parents Elsa and Gabriel were deported from Vienna to the ghettos of Theresienstadt. There he remained with his family for two years. After intense crowding, Frankl and his family were sent to Aushwitz for a brief period and then later Tu'rkheim and Kaufering II (Pytell, 2007). Frankl left without his father, however, having starved to death in Theresienstadt. His mother and brother were gassed upon immediate arrival at Auschwitz and his wife Tilly died shortly thereafter in Bergen-Belsen. Overall Frankl spent a total of 6 months in the concentration camps from October 19, 1944,

¹³ Commenting on the loss of the Austrian empire, Edmundson (2007) records, "In a letter written November 11, 1918 Freud states, "Austria-Hungary is no more. I do not want to live anywhere else. For me emigration is out of the question. I shall live on with the torso and imagine that it is the whole." For all his protestations of scorn, Freud could not bear to leave the city where he had dwelt since age four" (p. 238).

to April 27, 1945, not including his two years in Theresienstadt (Pytell, 2007). Within the first hour of arriving in the camp, Frankl, and the thousands of others accompanying him, were stripped of their names, their clothes, and all familiarity or continuity with their previous lives. Possessions were burned; families separated. It is nearly impossible to imagine the traumas inflicted within the overwhelming walls of the concentration camps, but no doubt their immensity left a profound psychological impact on those who lived in their shadows.¹⁴ Frankl was liberated on April 27, 1945 and slowly returned to Vienna thereafter—without family, broken, tired, and hungry.

It is nearly impossible to quantify oppression and psychological traumas of these kinds.¹⁵ What is clear, however, from the brief account above is that both Frankl and Freud experienced suffering throughout their lives. How is it that amidst these sufferings these two psychological thinkers arrived at such different views on human nature? One notable distinction, I argue, is the ways in which Frankl and Freud interpreted the respective sufferings they endured as well as the elements of resilience they employed.

During the years of deportation and living within a concentration camp, Frankl, time and time again, acknowledged a spiritual dimension of reality that gave him a *reason* and deeper sense of purpose through which his individual sufferings found meaning. Frankl (1997) observes,

“If a prisoner felt that he could no longer endure the realities of camp life, he found a way out in his mental life an invaluable opportunity to dwell in the spiritual domain, the one that the SS were unable to destroy. Spiritual life strengthened the prisoner, helped him adapt and thereby improved his chances of survival” (p. 123).

In addition, Frankl (1984) suggests, “the consciousness of one’s inner value is anchored in higher, more spiritual things, and cannot be shaken by camp life” (p. 83). Frankl maintained a positive view of the future by also holding fast to Nietzsche’s well known maxim that “he who has a *why* to live for can bear with almost any how.” After reflecting on his experiences in the camps, Frankl suggests that, among other things, the hope of seeing his wife again as well as being a source of social good within the camps sustained his will to live and conviction to endure suffering.¹⁶ For example, Viktor Frankl continually strived while in the camps to serve others. Frankl used his training in medicine and psychiatry to aid the suffering of others while at the same time enduring that of his own. This “decentering of the self” and revolving around the “other” where important factors that promoted a sense of resilience not only amidst Frankl’s suffering experiences but also as could be observed in others. This service to others provided a deeper meaning and purpose through which

¹⁴ I would contend that the suffering experiences of Frankl, and others within the camps are reminiscent of Turner’s (1967) liminality. Once forced off the crowded train at gunpoint, Frankl was seen to “slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space” (Turner, 1967, p 95). Within the camp, Frankl became “neither here nor there,” he was “betwixt and between” spaces and identities (Turner, 1969, p. 95).

¹⁵ Indeed, even Frankl suggests, “suffering completely fills the human soul and conscious mind, no matter whether the suffering is great or little. Therefore the “size” of human suffering is absolutely relative” (p. 64).

¹⁶ Frankl (1984) also mentions several other factors that helped him rise above the existential immediacies of his suffering including, humor, the beauty of a sunset and art, love for his fellow inmates, and Jewish prayers. In this way, Frankl outlines factors that may be associated with contemporary understandings of *resilience*.

Frankl's negative experiences were viewed; and was, moreover, also observed to be a key factor in healing and resilience more generally (Hatala, 2010). In this way, we can see how Frankl's suffering experiences were interpreted within or painted on the canvas of what could be understood as a belief in a "supermeaning" or God (Leslie, 1996; Pytell, 2007). Frankl clearly held religious convictions deep within his negative experiences and even observed, "a good many men learned in concentration camp, and as a result of concentration camp, to believe in God again" (Frankl, 1984, p. 104).

In contrast to Frankl's assertions that religious convictions and beliefs in a supermeaning can help individuals find a deeper purpose within their suffering experiences, in *The Future of an Illusion*, Sigmund Freud (1927) suggests the irrational and neurotic influences of religion and the belief in some higher power on the human psyche. Freud described religion as "potentially so infantile, so foreign to reality ...it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life" (Freud, 1930, p. 11). Overall, then, Freud viewed religion as a form of communal neurosis with rituals and practices that acted as defenses against forbidden desires. It is at this point that Frankl and Freud again diverge. Frankl saw religion as a source of meaning and the context within which the struggle for a worthwhile goal can become meaningful. In contrast, Freud was skeptical of anything he thought created a unity—in mind and society—and thus left religion behind and ignored its potential utility. From this perspective we could say that the belief in what Freud would call "illusions of the mind" actually helped Frankl maintain a positive view of human nature amidst his years of suffering. It could be argued, therefore, that Frankl's belief in a "supermeaning" and his ability to reinterpret his sufferings within a wider spiritual context were important distinctions that helped to change the developmental course of his theoretical ideologies as compared to Freud's.

To conclude, Freud's view of human nature was essentially negative and deterministic; the individual being controlled, in large part, by their unconscious aggressive instinctual drives. In the end, the two World Wars and intense personal suffering experiences served to support Freud's oblique views of human nature. In contrast, however, and although experiencing a great deal of suffering within concentration camps, Frankl came to acknowledge the positive, hopeful and non-deterministic aspects of human nature. Particularly, Frankl observed within the camps an important dimension of the self almost entirely absent from Freud's work—namely, the ability to "transcend" the self or the lower human aspects determined by biological mechanisms. It was suggested that the belief in a "supermeaning," as well as a deeper *reason* for suffering found through the love for his wife, and his commitment to serving his fellow inmates, fostered in Frankl, and other's within the camps, the ability to transcend these lower human aggressive tendencies and a sense of resilience ultimately leading to and confirming Frankl's non-fatalistic views suffering and human nature. This would suggest, therefore, that particular theoretical ideologies, or individuals' conceptual frameworks, are not objective accounts of reality; but rather emerge, as we have seen, through the interaction between local social experiences and global socio-political factors.

ON THE THERAPUTIC ENCOUNTER

In previous sections I suggested that in order to understand the factors leading to the development of Frankl and Freud's perspectives of culture and the self we must look not only to the global societal factors of the Austrian cultural milieu, but also to the level of individual experience and examine what was at stake in their local social worlds. In this section the exploration continues, by tracing how those global and local factors influence their varying perspectives of the self and culture, which, in turn, have influenced Frankl and Freud's approaches to therapeutic practice. This section begins with a discussion on Frankl and Freud's perspectives of mental health and psychological functioning and ends with a brief discussion regarding their views on the therapeutic approach.

PERSPECTIVES OF MENTAL HEALTH

The term "psychoanalysis" was first used by Freud in 1896 and came largely as a result of his workings with hysteria patient Anna O. and her "talking" through the illness (Freud, 1952). Other notable case studies involved a diverse range of mental disorders including: hysteria (Dora Case), phobia (little Hans), obsessional neurosis (Rat man) and paranoia (Schreber Case). From Freud's perspective, mental illness predominantly originates from early childhood experiences of frustration that occur along certain psychosexual stages of development.¹⁷ These early negative experiences (such as sexual abuse or too much stress during toilet training) are repressed into the deep abyss of the unconscious and appear later in life as symptoms of mental illness (Cotti, 2008). As Freud (1952) suggests, the predominant psychoanalytic interpretation of these cases is "that the symptoms of these patients are not mentally determined or removable by analysis, but that they must be regarded as direct toxic consequences of disturbed sexual chemical processes" (p 26). Although Austria at this time was predominantly a catholic state, modernization and secularization of society was increasing, and thus the centrality of the biological aspects of humans were becoming pervasive within academic circles. This conclusion regarding the underlying causes of mental illnesses therefore reflects the broader social discourses of Austrian Bourgeois materialism (Fromm, 1980). Moreover, Freud was convinced that all human behavior could essentially be explained by internal drives originating from biological mechanisms (Cotti, 2008). Since Freud's primary aim was to understand human passions, an area previously charted by philosophers and playwrights not neurologists, (Fromm, 1980), and the only well-known connection between the psychic realm of passions and physiological realm during Freud's time was that of sexuality (Bry, & Rifkin, 1962), psychoanalysis differed to a kind of *pansexualism* to explain the majority of neurotic cases. Indeed, Johnston (1972) observes

"Freud's pansexualism hardly shocked anyone. Rather he crystallized a preoccupation with sex, which several disparate movements had awakened. Birth control, campaigns

¹⁷ Freud noted five stages of psychosexual development: oral (birth-1 year), anal (1-3 years), phallic (3-6 years), latency (6-11 years) and genital (adolescence). Freud suggested children move through a series of stages in which they are confronted with conflicts between social expectations and biological drives.

against venereal disease, study of sexual symbolism in folklore, emancipation of women, and critique of hypocritical morality had exposed the centrality of sex” (p. 250).

Due to the prevailing socio-political Viennese discourses within which Freud was developing his theories, his interpretation of neurosis, pathology, and psychological illness naturally become, in large part, the product of *sexual frustration*: between the demands of the unconscious (“I”) on the one hand and the imposed requirements of social reality or culture on the other (“Me”). Theories of repression, the unconscious, the significance of the sexual life and the importance of infantile experiences, therefore, form the fundamental constituents that make up the theoretical structure of Freud’s psychoanalysis.

In distinction, the cause of mental illness within Frankl’s logotherapy originates from *existential frustration*: the frustration of the “will to meaning” or the inability to find meaning in one’s life (Frankl, 1984). Frankl’s logotherapy can generally be understood as meaning centered psychotherapy, and indeed Logos is derived from the Greek word to denote meaning. Moreover, the *will to meaning* becomes a central thrust of logotherapy, versus the *will to pleasure* in Freudian psychoanalysis.¹⁸ Viktor Frankl (1984) used the term *noögenic neurosis* (from the Greek noös which refers to the mind), an idea in contrast to the *psychogenic neurosis* of psychotherapy where illness typically originates from the biological disposition of the individual. From the noögenic perspective, suffering is not always a pathological problem as is typical with psychoanalysis. Rather, Frankl suggests that more than being a symptom of neurosis, suffering is potentially a human achievement; especially when elicited from existential frustration. Moreover, Frankl (1984) asserts, “existential frustration is in itself neither pathological nor pathogenic. A persons concern, even his despair, over the worthwhileness of life is an existential distress but by no means a mental disease” (p. 123). Thus Frankl argues that psychotherapy is inadequate in theory and practice to address the majority of human distress simply because it dares not enter the philosophical and existential realm that forms the majority of mental illness (Frankl, 1963). Logotherapy, however, as a direct response to the deterministic and nihilistic aspects of psychoanalysis, purposefully operates along the dividing lines between medicine, religion and philosophy, thereby addressing and supplementing the neglected “humanness” of Freud’s psychotherapeutic approach (Frankl, 1984).

As already mentioned, Frankl began theorizing about logotherapeutic ideas from as early as fifteen years old and was largely informed by his love of existential philosophy and positive views of human autonomy. During his concentration camp experiences, Frankl witnessed first hand the existential frustration of his comrades. However, existential frustration was not only present among the concentration camps. Frankl asserts that to a large extent the development of Western materialism and consumerism have eventuated in a sociological

¹⁸ Freud proposed the important meaning of neurotic symptoms as they relate to the life of the person and signify underlying repressed issues (Freud, 1924). However, Freud’s discussion of meaning was reserved for the connection between neurotic symptom and its underlying illness, whereas Frankl’s discussion pertained to the actual purpose and meaning in ones overall life.

condition he terms an existential vacuum.¹⁹ Therefore, such conditions as “Sunday neurosis”²⁰ or even such widespread phenomena as suicide, depression, aggression and addiction must be understood within the context of the existential vacuum underlying them (Frankl, 1984). Furthermore, an existential vacuum is largely associated with a pervasive state of nihilism that is understood as the idea that “being” essentially has no meaning. For these reasons, many of Frankl’s ideas were generated in response to Freud’s, arguing that psychotherapy is not able to help people experiencing existential frustration since his theories are saturated by early twentieth century trends of nihilistic philosophy. Frankl suggests, therefore, that psychotherapy, in Freud’s early days, represents a symptom of mass existential neurosis rather than its possible cure. Psychotherapy in its earliest state not only reflects a nihilistic philosophy but also has the potential risk of transmitting that ideology onto the patient (Frankl, 1984).

GOALS OF THE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH

Apart from the specifics of any one particular case, the overall goal of Freud’s psychoanalysis is to adjust the individual’s private drives and instinctual motivations to the demands of reality; often referred to as the *reality principle* (Freud, 1924).²¹ In this way, negative experiences lying in the unconscious are to be removed reflecting a surgical procedure in nature. Indeed, psychoanalytic therapy, from Freud’s (1924) view, “works to take root of the disease, among the conflicts from which the symptom proceeded and employs suggestion to change the outcome of these conflicts” (459). The goals of psychotherapy, therefore, involve a kind of education so as to reconcile the previous negative interpretation of developmental conflicts. Healing occurs with the help of the psychiatrist by re-writing the repressed conflict between the private drives and demands of reality (Cotti, 2008). In this way, the repressed negative experiences are brought forward from the unconscious to the conscious in order for integration and healing to ensue. To a large extent the therapist assists the patient to attain a certain state of balance or equilibrium between the conflicting claims of id, ego and superego.

In terms of therapeutic goals, Frankl early in his career began to offer an existential critique of Freud’s psychoanalysis. From this position, Pytell (2007) suggests that Frankl sought to move the focus of “Freudian depth psychology to a focus on issues of will, responsibility, and what he considered the spiritual dimension of man” (p. 644). In general, logotherapy’s goal is to facilitate the patients search for meaning within their life and to make them

¹⁹ Frankl (1984; 1963) defines existential in three ways: 1) Existence itself-the specifically human mode of being; 2) the meaning of existence; and 3) the striving to find a concrete meaning in ones existence, that is, the will to meaning. The existential vacuum largely refers to the latter two forms.

²⁰ This refers to a kind of depression described by Frankl that afflicts people in Western societies when the busy rush of the week subsides and they are faced with the boredom or lack of meaningful content in their lives.

²¹ In recent times, this perspective is often interpreted as an attack against religious or spiritual inclinations. Indeed, sentiments from Freud’s work continue to impact contemporary psychologists like Albert Ellis, the founder of rational emotive therapy who also had considerable influence in creating cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). Ellis (1980) argues that religiosity “is in many respects equivalent to irrational thinking and emotional disturbances”, so “the elegant therapeutic solution to emotional problems is to be quite unreligious (...) The less religious the people are, the more emotionally healthy they will tend to be” (p. 637).

aware of the hidden logos of their existence. Frankl (1984) suggests, “What man actually needs for mental health and well-being is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for a worthwhile goal, a freely chosen task” (p 127). From here, Frankl employs the term *noödynamics* to signify the existential dynamics in a polar field of tension, where one pole is represented by a meaning that is to be fulfilled and the other pole by the person who has to fulfill it (Frankl, 1984). Therefore, as opposed to the view of balance within Freud’s psychoanalysis, the logotherapist works to create a certain amount of tension by challenging a patient with a potential meaning for their life. Meaning in this sense is not derived from an abstract picture of the world, but from the local social events in ones life.²²

In the concentration camps, Frankl witnessed this meaning making process in others and also had personal experiences of this meaning making process, which together ultimately helped solidify his logotherapeutic ideas. To highlight one example, Viktor Frankl was striving to stay alive in the camps with the assistance of an unpublished manuscript he was intently working on prior to the Nazi invasion.²³ Frankl believed his logotherapeutic ideas would be of value to the psychiatric field; therefore, this goal provided a meaning to live for that was greater than he alone. Based on these experiences, Frankl came to believe that mental health is derived from a tension between what one has already achieved and what one ought to still to accomplish (Frankl, 1984). Moreover, this perspective asserts that health is the active process of being engaged in the world. Thus, logotherapy challenges individuals to health by helping them take a stand on their being in the world, as opposed to ideas of passive balance emphasized within psychoanalysis.

To conclude, then, after arriving at different perspectives of the self, human nature and culture, both psychiatrists came to articulate differing therapeutic approaches. In general, Freud sought balance and unification of the unconscious with the conscious or the individual and the larger social environment; whereas, Frankl inspired tension to help people find meaning in life. Moreover, Frankl’s logotherapy deviates from Freud’s psychotherapy insofar as it considers humans as beings whose main concern is in finding or fulfilling a meaning rather than in the mere gratification and satisfaction of drives and instincts, or in merely reconciling the conflicting claims of id, ego and superego. It is argued that these differences were, in large part, the result of variations in local social experiences as well as the different global socio-political influences.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: FRIEND OR FOE?

The overall purpose of this paper was to work towards a cultural and developmental perspective of theoretical ideologies generally and a situated perspective of Frankl and Freud specifically. The perspective of culture adopted for this analysis primarily involved Kleinman’s (1995) conceptions that culture involves “what is at stake” for particular individuals in particular situations, with a focus on “collective (both local and societal) and

²² According to Frankl (1984), this meaning can come from three sources; (1) creating work or doing a deed; (2) experiencing something or encountering someone; and (3) the attitude we take towards unavoidable suffering.

²³ The manuscript Frankl was working on is now published as: Frankl, V. E. (1963). *The Doctor and the Soul*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

individual (both public and intimate) levels of analysis” (p. 98). Similarly, from a developmental perspective, Valsiner’s (2000) ideas that conceptual frameworks are constructed by individuals out of the dialogue between the needs within their local situations and the cultural factors available to them was also employed in the previous analysis. In looking to understand the difference between Frankl and Freud, as well as the ways in which their theories are historically and culturally situated, this paper therefore argued that social science researchers must not only examine the broader Austrian and Viennese cultural milieu of the early twentieth century, but also look towards the local world of individual experiences and “what was at stake” for these two thinkers while developing their theories.

The goals of this paper were pursued within the context of three interrelated ideas: perspectives on the role of cultural systems; perspectives of the self or human nature; and perspectives of the therapeutic encounter. In terms of *cultural systems*, Freud’s perspective of culture is such that it acts from the outside of an individual to suppress the natural aggressive biological instincts within. In contrast, Frankl suggests that culture emerges from within the individual and becomes manifest as the result of a dialogue between the broader social world and the autonomous choice. Although there are potentially many factors that could influence the development of Frankl and Freud’s theoretical ideologies, a prominent example explored in this section was the sociopolitical context and time periods that separated them—in that, Freud’s views were largely inspired by Habsburg bureaucracy and, in turn, Frankl’s views, coming nearly fifty years later, were a response against this authoritative and suppressive perspective of culture. In terms of the *self or human nature*, on the one hand we saw how Freud’s views are essentially negative and deterministic; the individual being controlled, in large part, by their unconscious aggressive instinctual drives. The two World Wars and intense personal suffering experiences served to support Freud’s perspective. On the other hand, however, Frankl came to acknowledge the positive, hopeful and non-deterministic aspects of human nature. In particular, within the concentration camps Frankl observed that individuals are able to transcend the self or the lower human aspects determined by biological mechanisms. Moreover, it was suggested that the belief in a “supermeaning,” as well as a deeper *reason* for suffering found through the love for his wife, his service to others, and the hope to continue developing his emerging logotherapeutic ideas, fostered in Frankl a sense of resilience that ultimately confirmed his non-fatalistic views of suffering and human nature. In terms of the *therapeutic encounter*, Freud’s psychotherapy generally sought balance and unification among the unconscious and conscious aspects of the individual as well as between the individual and the larger social environment; whereas, Frankl inspired tension to help people find meaning and purpose in life. Moreover, based on their different perspectives of human nature, Frankl’s logotherapy differs from Freud’s psychotherapy insofar as it considers humans as beings whose main concern is in finding or fulfilling a meaning rather than in the mere gratification and satisfaction of drives and instincts.

Overall, this paper demonstrates how the differing perspectives of these two eminent psychological thinkers is as much due to the development of their unique conceptual frameworks that fostered different perspectives of reality as it was due to the global social-political and historical distinctions that characterized the Austrian and Viennese cultural

landscape of the early twentieth century. More generally, this endeavor was crucial not only to understand the historical context within which Frankl and Freud developed their theories but also—by appropriately contextualizing their ideas—helped examine their limitations and advantages. This cultural and developmental perspective of a theoretical ideology supports the idea that intellectual theories themselves are not completely “free-floating” on the one hand, nor are they completely culturally bounded or “hermetically sealed” on the other (Keesing, 1990). Rather, as this paper suggests, intellectual theories are in dialogue and negotiation with broader socio-cultural or political systems of their time, as well as the local social world of their originator.

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